This paper attempts to carry out a "meta-foresight analysis. Using the UK experience as an example, it offers a model of the development of foresight and draws some conclusions on its role. The main hypothesis is that there have been three generations of activity which meet the definition of foresight. First Generation foresight consists of technology forecasts. Second Generation foresight combines technology and market perspectives, while Third Generation foresight integrates technology, markets and the social dimension. Third Generation activity implies the participation of social stakeholders and has an agenda of thematic, socio-economic problem-solving. In the current situation of meeting the challenges of globalisation, several exercises which began with a technology focus have come back with recommendations that focus upon the infrastructure for national innovation systems. The rationale for Third Generation foresight is to address the problem of system failure - insufficient bridging institutions.
The paper concludes that foresight is not a single approach to a single problem nor a panacea. Approaches contain an inherent tension between promoting networking and identifying priorities. However, with the aid of international learning foresight has helped to channel science and technology towards the solution of national problems. In future, foresight will need to address the onset of massive interdisciplinarity and new research paradigms. Ultimately, its effects depend upon high-level political commitment, wide participation, deep interaction and a long-term view of the benefits.
The past decade has seen rapid developments in the design and practice of national technology foresight activities. This paper seeks to offer a model of the development of foresight as a means of understanding the roles and functions it has acquired and a basis for evaluating its significance. The specific experience of the United Kingdom is used as an example. As a starting point it is important to have a working definition of foresight. In the English language, the term was first used to refer to studies of the future by the classic science fiction writer H.G.Wells. In a BBC broadcast in the 1930s he called for the institution of "professors of foresight" who, in an analogous role to that of historians, would seek to interpret and make sense of future technological developments. Nonetheless, up until the 1980s the common terminology for the field used the word "forecasting". The shift to foresight has not been only a semantic one. Forecasting is associated with a predictive, single future perspective while foresight widens the frame to consider alternative futures and the creation of actions to get to the desired goal. The initial definition used in the first United Kingdom Technology Foresight Programme in 1984 was:
A systematic means of assessing those scientific and technological developments which, in the longer term, could have a strong impact on economic and social development.
The key elements in this definition are: first that the process should be systematic (going beyond the unstructured musings of a panel); second that science and technology should be a central focus; third that the timeframe should be longer term (a UK shorthand has been that longer term starts beyond the business planning horizon); and fourth that the developments should be understood in terms of their inter-relationship with economic and social developments. This last criterion has been critical to foresight and will be a principal theme in this paper.
To conclude these introductory comments, it is worth considering the reasons why we have seen this emergence of foresight. From the perspective of policymakers a key driver has been the need to set priorities for funding science and technology in the face of restricted budgets. Budget constraints have coincided with growing international competition in science as the biosciences revolution and the consequences of information and communications technologies demand rising investment to keep pace. Policy thinking has also recognised the importance of fostering networking in the economy.
From an industrial perspective, the motivation is different. Here, the situation is that companies operating in the "network economy" have to manage interfaces with customers, suppliers, collaborators, regulators and other stakeholders. Foresight offers a means of creating a shared strategic vision which has the potential to reduce the uncertainty involved in innovation (Georghiou, 1996).
One further reason for the upsurge in foresight activity is psychological. The period leading up to the Millennium in the Western calendar stimulated an interest in the future which may have smoothed the path for those advocating the need for foresight activity.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the development of foresight can be understood in terms of three generations of activity:
It should be stressed at the outset that these distinctions are ideal types. Most foresight programmes past and present contain elements from more than one of the generations. The developmental model bears some analogy to progress in how we think about innovation, where the linear model of technology transfer has now been recognised as a rare special case. Second and Third Generation foresight are more akin to the Mode 2 hypothesis of Gibbons et al (1994), who characterise research of this type as being carried out in the context of a problem addressed through the joint production of knowledge.
Exploring some of the dimensions of the differences between foresight generations, we may first turn to the actors involved in the process. First Generation foresight is clearly in the domain of the technological experts and may even be confined to the professional futurologists. In the Second Generation the key actors are from academia and industry, particularly those who are able to span the gap between them. Third Generation foresight adds social stakeholders such as voluntary organisations, consumer groups, pressure groups etc. In addition, the presence of government becomes more important, not from those parts responsible for science but from Ministries which seek to represent the public interest on matters such as health, safety and the environment.
It follows from these differences in focus that the generations should result in different structures for foresight, for example in the way panels or surveys are delineated. First Generation follows directly the disciplinary taxonomies of science and engineering. Second Generation is much more likely to be structured in terms if industrial and service sectors to provide a bridge to the economy. For Third Generation foresight the organising principle, as mentioned, is socio-economic problem solving and hence the structure is thematic, reflecting socio-economic problems to be addressed. Interdisciplinarity is likely to characterise panels.
Figure 1 Overview of Foresight Methods
Source: Loveridge and van der Meulen in Cameron et al
The mix of foresight methods chosen may also vary. Figure 1 shows a classification of foresight methods between the three poles of creativity, expertise and interaction o alignment. While all generations of foresight use combinations of creativity and consultation with expertise, only the Second and Third Generations integrate methods for interaction and alignment. The novelty of this pole has made it the hardest one to achieve successfully.
The international dimension of foresight is manifested both in the process itself and in the reasons for establishment of national programmes. Figure 2 gives a chronology of national and regional foresight activities with a basic classification scheme which separates those based mainly on Delphi from those based mainly on other approaches such as panels, scenarios or critical technologies exercises. A third group combined the two. This separation allows some of the international learning experiences to be traced. The best-known example is that of the "family tree" of Delphi surveys originating with the Japanese Science and Technology Agency's 30-year forecasts. A second sequence is that of critical technologies exercises, while a third uses scenario-based methods. The first UK Programme has been used as a template by several more recent activities and itself was influenced by its predecessors. The typical pattern today for a prospective foresight programme or activity is to begin by commissioning an international review. This may be seen as a positive development so long as those involved remember that each national approach is both aided and constrained by the national culture, ranging from high level aspects such as industry-government relations through to basic practical features such as the attitude of respondents to questionnaires.
| Year | Delphi | Mixed | Panel/scenario/critical technologies |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1970s | 30 years in Japan | ||
| 1989 | Ministry of Economic Affairs Netherlands | ||
| 1990 | 1st German | ||
| 1991 - | 1st Critical Technologies USA | ||
| 1992 | Public Good Science Fund New Zealand | ||
| 1993 | 1st South Korea | 2nd Critical Technologies USA Technologies at Threshold of 21st Century Germany | |
| 1994 | France Japan/Germany Mini Delphi | 1st UK TF Programme | Ministry of Economic Affairs Netherlands |
| 1995 | 100 Key Technologies France 3rd Critical Technologies USA | ||
| 1996 | Japan - German Delphi Austria | Matching S&T to Future Needs Australia Foresight Steering Committee, NethNetherlands | |
| 1997 | ANEP Spain | Ireland | |
| 1998 | TEP Hungary South Africa | New Zealand Sweden, 4th Critical Technologies USA IPTS Futures EU | |
| 1999 2000 |
2nd South Korea Japan 7th Survey | APEC Multi-economy Venezuela | 2nd UK TF Programme FUTUR Germany National TF China; Brazil |
It is noticeable that the great majority of the foresight activities shown in the Table are national. This raises the question of whether, in a situation where markets and technology are largely global, there remains a relevant role for national foresight. It is unlikely that unique technical insights will emerge from any national community of experts. To understand the phenomenon of national foresight it is necessary to take a step back and to consider what competitiveness means at a national level (rather than that of the individual firm). Essentially, competitiveness at a national level is largely based upon the ability of a country to provide an environment which attracts and retains firms. Key elements of this include:
In the light of this list, foresight may be seen in a different way - as an exercise in drawing upon global vision to configure the national innovation system in such a way as it may best meet these criteria. There is evidence that this is happening even when it is not initially intended. Foresight panels in more than one country have been given remits with a technological orientation and nonetheless have returned with recommendations which mainly concern the infrastructure embodied in the list.
The UK provides an example of the evolution of Foresight through three generations. First Generation activity took place during the 1980s when the principal advisory committee on research policy (ACARD, 1986) undertook and published an exercise which sought to identify "exploitable areas of science". A priority list of technologies was produced through the efforts of the panel but little follow-up ensued. The Second Generation was manifested in the first UK Technology Foresight Programme announced in 1993 and running through to 1998. This explicitly sought to bring together technology and the market. The detail of this exercise is well known but the point may be emphasised by considering the key image of the programme, the attractiveness and feasibility matrix produced by the Steering Group in its report (Figure 3). The two dimensions are composed of elements representing the market opportunities for the UK and the scientific and industrial feasibility of achieving them.
Figure 3 Matrix of Priorities from the First UK Foresight Programme
The implementation phase of the first cycle could be seen to be demonstrating the feature of alignment. Some implementation activities were aimed principally at dissemination - hence the Panels used the media, workshops and intermediaries such as professional and trade associations to stage some 600 events and to distribute 130,000 reports. On its own this is a poor indicator of effectiveness as it simply aggregates inputs. However, other activities showed clearer impact - priorities emerging from the Programme were embodied in a follow-up funding initiative, the Foresight Challenge which attracted a large number of applications with industry co-funding. A substantial amount of Research Council funding was aligned with Foresight priorities. It is of course difficult to establish direct causality as many influences are involved but the effect of Foresight on new initiatives was particularly evident.
Alignment took place within the Challenge funding bids but could also be discerned at a higher level. An important effect came with other Government departments acting to follow-up foresight in their own spheres of responsibility (for example transport, construction and defence). Better coordination between government departments in the area of science and technology was also a result.
A clear reward for the S&T community's support for Foresight came in the Government's Comprehensive Spending Review when a major increase in science funding partly rested upon the case made through foresight.
A summary evaluation of the First Cycle shows success in gaining widespread support, producing priorities which though rather broad were generally accepted, and most importantly stimulating the formation of new networks. Problems were insufficient time allowed to develop mature conclusions, communication problems between Panels and between Panel members and non-members. There was also a tendency to promote "technical fix" solutions even though the main problem identified was social.
Turning to the second (current) cycle of the UK Programme, efforts have been made to address some of the limitations of its predecessor. In so doing, some Third Generation features are evident. In this case the key image of the Programme is one of alignment (Figure 4).
Figure 4 Structure of UK Second Cycle Foresight Programme
Source: Blueprint for the Next Round of Foresight Office of Science and Technology
While some sectoral (technology/market) Panels remain, three Thematic Panels have been introduced in the areas of the ageing population, crime prevention and manufacturing. The first two at least (and in practice the third) focus on social change as a primary driver and seek to integrate this with technology and the market. The themes are problem-centred and demand interdisciplinary approaches. A new form of alignment takes place at the bottom of the triangle where external bodies such as trade associations can run "Associate Programmes" in foresight specialising in their own areas and with a general endorsement from the Programme. A potential future problem may emerge in deciding how to treat the outputs of Associate Programmes. The fact that they have mounted a sub-programme does not mean that their area automatically becomes a priority. There may be some eventual disappointment when this is realised.
The three generations of foresight may also be distinguished by the economic rationales which underpin them and by the approach which should be taken to evaluate them. First Generation Foresight rests in the domain of economic planning. Second Generation is within a market perspective but its rationale for existence is one of market failure - that firms have excessively short horizons and that intervention is necessary to stimulate them to take a longer view and consequently to afford a higher priority to research. In Third Generation Foresight the rationale is one of system failure, whereby there are insufficient bridging institutions in the socio-economic system and foresight provides an arena in which the necessary network connections can be made.
As foresight programmes mature there is a growing demand for them to be evaluated. In First Generation foresight, evaluation is concerned with the accuracy of prediction and the diffusion of results. For the first criterion some form of peer review is needed, while the second employs a technology transfer model.
Second Generation foresight entails some checking of the extent to which prio0rirties have been taken up but it shares with Third Generation foresight a need to evaluate the formation of new networks. In the latter case these networks could be more broadly founded and include social stakeholders. An elusive concept to evaluate is the establishment of a foresight culture. This is best addressed by looking for persistent foresight activity among former participants. The whole process of evaluation is complicated by the dependence of foresight upon the goodwill of volunteers, so any approach to evaluation must remain unintrusive.
The first conclusion to be drawn from reviewing foresight experience to date is that it is neither a single approach to a single problem nor a panacea for all national problems. The variety of foresight experiences demonstrates that no one method or structure is best - the choice must reflect both fitness for purpose and the national culture in which it is situated.
International learning has undoubtedly advanced the development of foresight through the Second and Third Generations during the 1990s. The onset of Third Generation thinking emphasises the need for science and technology to serve both the economy and society. The future problems faced demand "massive interdisciplinarity" (the combination of widely different subjects) and in some cases a new research paradigm which integrates the need of emergent sectors of the economy. This does not negate the earlier conclusion that the choice of approach in foresight must suit national circumstances and if necessary draw upon elements of First, Second and Third Generation foresight.
No programme can be optimised for all objectives. In particular, there is an inherent tension between the promotion of networking and the extraction of priorities for funding. The more inclusive and alignment oriented a programme is, the more difficult it is ensure that all emergent ideas are systematically compared and treated hierarchically. Indeed, an attempt to do this may inhibit collaboration.
A simple way to summarise the conditions for success in foresight is the need for: